This paper analyzes the impact of job insecurity perceptions on individual well-being.
Introduction
Perceived job insecurity has been a recurring theme in sociology, organizational psychology and other fields of the social sciences. While economists are accustomed to focusing on objective labor market outcomes, such as wages or objective unemployment risk, the analysis of entirely subjective concepts such as perceived job insecurity can provide valuable insights.
After all, one can argue that it is individuals' perceptions of reality rather than objective features of reality that determine individual behavior. of perceived job insecurity on individual well-being. Most contributions on the subject can be found in the organizational and social psychology literature, which dates back at least to Cobb and Kasl (1977) , who postulate that anticipation of unemployment is as harmful for individuals' well-being, operationalized by a variety of physiological and psychological indicators, as unemployment itself. Numerous studies have since related perceived job insecurity to individual psychological and physical health as well as psychological well-being (see, e.g., Ferrie et al. 2004 , De Witte 1999 and Sverke and Hellgren 2002 for surveys of the literature).
While unobserved individual heterogeneity is generally ignored in the psychological literature on the subject, which makes causal inference difficult, studies also vary starkly with respect to the operationalization of perceived job insecurity. Johnson, Messe and Crano (1984) , for instance, utilize information on subjective fears of job loss, thereby implicitly taking into account the subjective probability of the job loss event and the associated expected costs.
Other authors only use information on individual assessments of the probability of becoming unemployed (e.g., De Witte 1999) or of losing their job in the near future (e.g., Mohr 2000) .
In an effort to improve on one-dimensional measures of perceived job insecurity, authors such as Ashford, Lee and Bobko (1989) and Hellgren, Sverke and Isaksson (1999) have conducted more detailed interviews and aggregated several items related to subjective job insecurity into job insecurity scales that reflect the perceived security of the job itself as well as of specific job features.
Building on this large body of empirical studies in the field of psychology, a small literature on the subject is emerging in economics, however, accounting for unobserved individual heterogeneity plaguing the aforementioned earlier contributions. Clark, Knabe and Rätzel (2009) , using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), revisit the social norm hypothesis as put forward by authors such as Clark (2003) and Stutzer and Lalive (2004) and find that aggregate unemployment has a less negative or even positive well-being effect for employed respondents with high perceived job insecurity and for unemployed respondents with poor employment prospects. A related study by Knabe and Rätzel (2009) evaluates the role of perceived job insecurity in individual well-being in comparison to the effects of past unemployment experience. While earlier studies (e.g., Clark et al. 2001 ) highlight the importance of past unemployment experience for individuals' well-being even after becoming reemployed, the authors argue that this effect operates through individual perceptions; thus according to Knabe and Rätzel (2009) , it is not past unemployment per se that makes people unhappy but related perceptions about their job security.
While the aforementioned studies have greatly advanced our understanding of the relevance of perceived job insecurity for individuals' well-being, it is regrettable that they lack a clear conceptualization of job insecurity perceptions. In what follows, we will show that in the analysis of individual well-being the correct operationalization of perceived job insecurity is essential to avoid omitted variable and simultaneity bias. Section 2 introduces the concept of perceived job insecurity in a slightly more formal way and discusses its measurement and required data. Section 3 implements perceived job insecurity in a model of individual wellbeing and discusses potential simultaneity bias. Section 4 applies a new operationalization of perceived job security to individual data from a large household panel survey and assesses the size of the endogeneity bias empirically. Section 5 concludes.
The Concept of Perceived Job Insecurity
Following authors such as Manski and Straub (2000) , Green et al. (2000) and Nickell et al. (2002) , perceived job insecurity essentially consists of two elements: the perceived probability of job loss and the subjective costs associated with job loss. Accordingly, we denote perceived job security of individual i at time t most generally as follows:
with p denoting the subjective probability of job loss and (U it − U it ) the expected difference between utility with and without the present job with Accordingly, the only assumptions we have made sofar are that perceived job insecurity increases with the expected risk of job loss and the associated costs. We further may assume
e. an individual's utility in the present job U it is at least as high as or higher than expected utility outside the present job U it . This seems plausible because if this assumption did not hold, one would have to ask why an individual actually were in his or her present job in the first place. However, it is also conceivable, at least temporarily,
The size of the job loss cost component (U it − U it ) depends on expected pecuniary as well as non-pecuniary effects of job loss. Pecuniary effects occur due to the difference between current job earnings and unemployment compensation (see e.g., Nickell, Jones and Quintini, 2002) or through reduced earnings in a new job. Other expected pecuniary effects may stem from, for example, foregone premiums and pensions, loss of fringe benefits, or the costs of moving or transport to a potential new workplace.
Of course we would also expect substantial non-pecuniary effects. Numerous studies have established that in terms of individual well-being, the non-pecuniary effects of unemployment are in fact larger than the associated loss of income (see, e.g., Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998). As argued by social psychologists such as Jahoda (1981, 1988) , these non-pecuniary effects of unemployment are due to the associated loss of social contact outside the family, loss of purpose, status, and identity and perhaps most controversially due to the loss of imposed time structure. If the individual expects to experience some spell of unemployment after job loss, it seems likely that some if not all of the associated non-pecuniary effects are anticipated. After all, even if the individual does not expect to remain unemployed after job loss we can speculate that she may expect to be deprived of at least some of the latent functions of the current job.
A further assumption that seems logical is that if one of the perceived job security components is zero, perceived job insecurity would also be zero no matter what value the other component takes on, that is, the two terms enter the function in a multiplicative way. Thus, if the expected probability of job loss is zero, the expected costs of job loss should not matter.
At the same time, regardless of the expected probability of job loss, if the utility levels inside and outside the present job are identical there is no insecurity. Under this condition we can substantiate perceived job security such that:
At present there exist several individual-level surveys that provide the required information for operationalizing perceived job insecurity. "How likely is it that one or more of the following occupational changes will take place in your life within the next two years? -lose your job?" with answers lying on an equidistant eleven point scale ranging from 0 "definitely not" to 100 "definitely." Figure 1 plots the distribution of p within the groups of respondents that are "not concerned," "somewhat concerned," and "very concerned" about their job security. What becomes clear is that perceived job insecurity is only loosely related to the expected probability of job loss. About 60 percent of respondents who state being "not concerned" about their job security have an expected job loss probability of zero percent, which is reassuring. Furthermore, as one would expect, average expected job loss probability is higher among the group of "somewhat concerned" and further increases for the group of "very concerned." However, Figure 1 also points to remarkable inconsistencies, since within the group of the "very concerned" and the group of "somewhat concerned" the share of respondents with an expected job loss probability of zero is 15 and 25 percent, respectively. Thus, a significant proportion of respondents are concerned about job security but do not expect at all to lose their job within the next two years. Figure 2 depicts the actual shares of respondents who are "not concerned", "somewhat concerned" and "very concerned" about their job security and corresponding average predicted shares from a descriptive ordered probit model with subjective job loss risk p it included as the only explanatory variable, but for more generality captured non-parametrically by a full set of dummy variables (see Column I of To improve on the overall predictive power of our descriptive model we therefore concentrate on the operationalization of the second term in (U it − U it ), that is, the expected out-of-job utility level. To capture this, we follow Schmidt (1999) and Manski and Straub (2000) and take into account information on the perceived chances of finding an equivalent job if the present one is lost. In the SOEP, individual interviews contain the following question: "If you lost your job today, would it be easy, difficult, or almost impossible for you to find a new position which is at least as good as your current one?." Thus, we have additional information on the subjectively expected costs of job loss. Accordingly, our polynomial approximation of Equation 1 now contains a full set of dummy variables for p it , a full set of dummy variables capturing subjectively expected costs of job loss, and a full set of interaction terms (see Column II of Table 1 ). Figure 2 shows that after taking information on the expected costs of job loss and associated interaction terms into account our average prediction of perceived job security matches much more closely actual shares of "not concerned", "somewhat concerned" and "very concerned" respondents. Clearly, one could improve the model further by controlling more thoroughly for observed as well as unobserved individual heterogeneity. However, for our descriptive analysis, this should suffice for demonstrating that there is indeed more to perceived job insecurity than expected job loss risk. Polynom. Pred.
Very Concerned
Note: Author's calculations, based on unbalanced SOEP sample of 13,598 individuals. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, ***, **, * statistically significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Default categories: p = 10%, Chance of finding equivalent job -easy. Sample of employed respondents.
Simultaneity
As mentioned earlier, numerous studies have proclaimed a causal link between perceived job insecurity and individual well-being (see, e.g., Ferrie et al. 2004 , De Witte 1999 , Sverke and Hellgren 2002 , Clark et al. 2009 , Knabe and Rätzel 2009 ).
However, if our conceptualization of perceived job security is correct we would expect perceived job insecurity and individual well-being to be simultaneously determined. Accordingly, parameter estimates that do not take simultaneity into account would be biased. We can derive this more formally and also form an expectation about the theoretical direction of the bias. Later we will present an application that tests for simultaneity and empirically quantifies the associated bias.
Let us start with the hypothesis that indeed perceived job insecurity and individual well-being are simultaneously determined. Accordingly we can write that:
with F and U denoting perceived job insecurity and subjective well-being and X representing any socio-economic control variables for individual i at time t.
Applying a bit of algebra we can derive an expression for the size and direction of the simultaneity bias of the estimated parameter δ for δ in Equation 4:
with β U δ = 1.
As suggested by, for example, Ferrie, Shipleya, Newman, Stansfeld and Marmot (2005), De Witte (1999), Sverke and Hellgren (2002) , Clark et al. (2009) and Knabe and Rätzel (2009) and in concordance with common sense, we obtain that δ < 0, that is, perceived job insecurity lowers individual well-being. Furthermore, according to our conceptualization of perceived job insecurity in Equation 1 we have β U > 0. Thus, we can derive that bias ≥ 0, that is, if perceived job insecurity and individual well-being are indeed simultaneously determined, the coefficient of perceived job insecurity will be upward-biased in any model assessing individual well-being and operationalizing perceived job insecurity by information on job loss concerns (as in, e.g., Johnson et al. 1984 , Clark et al. 2009 , Knabe and Rätzel 2009 ).
Needless to say, if instead perceived job insecurity is operationalized by expected job loss risk only (as in, e.g., Mohr 2000) coefficients would also probably be biased since expected job loss risk is only one component of perceived job insecurity, as demonstrated in Section 2.
The direction of bias would, however, depend on the covariance between p it and (
if it is positive then disregarding (U it − U it ) also yields upward-biased coefficients.
In other words, if our conceptualization of perceived job insecurity is indeed plausible then the effect of perceived job insecurity on individual well-being has been systematically underestimated in the previously discussed literature.
Application: The Size of the Bias
In the next section, we apply our concept of perceived job insecurity to concrete data from the SOEP and quantify the previously discussed potential endogeneity bias in a model of individual well-being. A detailed description of the data as well as summary statistics are provided in Appendix A. We want to estimate the relationship sketched out in Equation 4 accounting for individual observed and unobserved heterogeneity and take the potential simultaneity problem into account.
We specify following empirical model with fairly standard control variables (see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer 2002 , Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004 , Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2008 :
with i denoting the individual, r federal state, and t time. U is individual well-being and 
10
Perceived job insecurity enters the model through the interaction term emp × F , since our sample consists of employed, unemployed, and self-employed respondents as well as individuals out of the labor force, and perceived job insecurity at any given time is naturally only observed for employees. F consists of a dummy variable for individuals who are very concerned about their job security (F : very concerned) and a dummy variable for individuals who are somewhat concerned (F : somewhat concerned) with unconcerned individuals constituting the default category. The error term is decomposed into time-specific effects τ t and individual fixed effects µ i . The remaining error term it is allowed to be heteroscedastic, and according to our reasoning in Section 3, is expected to be correlated with F due to simultaneity.
As is common in such analyses we cannot directly observe individual life satisfaction.
In the individual questionnaires of the SOEP, individuals are asked to state their current life satisfaction: "How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered?" ranging from 0 "completely dissatisfied" to 10 "completely satisfied" on an equidistant eleven-point 8 We do not, however, interact regional unemployment rates by labor force status since the analysis of social norm effects as in, e.g., Stutzer and Lalive (2004) is beyond the scope of the present analysis. Furthermore, note that combining aggregate level and micro-level data could give rise to contemporaneous correlation and result in biased standard errors of the regional unemployment variable (see Moulton, 1986) . Unfortunately, applying sandwich-type formulas for clustered standard errors is not an option in the present analysis, since the number of clusters is too small (16 federal states).
9 Note that in our fixed effects specification with year dummies continuous age controls would result in perfect collinearity. Age interval dummies are identified through switches between categories.
10 Applying the equivalence scale is essential to separate the life satisfaction effects of children and household income. To calculate the equivalent scale household income, we simply divide household income by the squared sum of household members. The analysis is, however, robust to more elaborate methods. Furthermore, we do not include measures of relative income in our model as this is beyond the scope of the analysis. To test and account for potential simultaneity bias outlined in Section 3 we need excluded instruments that have sufficient predictive power for reported perceived job insecurity F and are orthogonal to the error term it in Equation 6. Importantly, as already discussed in Section 2, we do not observe perceived job insecurity on a cardinal but only on an ordinal scale. Accordingly, we capture and subsequently instrument perceived job insecurity falling into the categories "not concerned", "somewhat concerned" and "very concerned" by a set of dummy variables with the category "not concerned" as the default. Thus, we have to instrument for two variables simultaneously.
Following the discussion in Section 2, variables that capture individuals' perceptions of job loss risk and their perceived chances of finding an equivalent job seem to be promising candidates as valid instruments. Accounting for unobserved individual heterogeneity by a fixed effects specification, in a "first stage" we regress our dummy variables for F on all included and excluded instruments and test for the predictive power of our excluded instruments.
11 Accordingly, our initial model includes all explanatory variables from Column II in Table 1 in Section 2. Perceived job loss risk captured by a set of 11 dummy variables representing perceived job loss probability ranging from p=10% to p=100%, with p=0% being the default category and one dummy capturing item non-response. Furthermore, we 11 A non-linear "first stage" model is not required since Kelejian (1971) and Heckman (1978) show that a simple linear probability model is sufficient to obtain consistent estimates in the "second-stage regression." include dummy variables for individuals whose perceptions about their chances of finding an equivalent job fall in the category "almost impossible", "difficult", and a dummy variable for individuals who give no response to this question, "easy" constitutes the default category.
In addition we include full full set of interaction terms between the dummy variables for p and chances of finding an equivalent job.
Including all variables and interaction terms our initial GMM model uses 46 orthogonality restrictions. This is problematic since several studies summarized in Chapter 8.6.
of Wooldridge (2002) highlight the poor finite sample properties of GMM estimators with many overidentifying restriction. We therefore also estimate GMM models with a drastically reduced set of excluded instruments. Table 2 reports instrument validity tests for the "first stage" polynomial model specification with 46 orthogonality restrictions and for the reduced one. First of all, as the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic indicates, we can clearly reject underidentification for the reduced as well as for the polynomial specification.
12 In addition, we can clearly reject weak identification for the reduced specification, since the F statistic is far above the critical values reported in Stock and Yogo (2005) . However, for the polynomial specification we cannot reject weak identification for the male sample casting doubt on the explanatory power of at least some of the 46 excluded instruments.
13 Thus, we prefer the model specifications with a reduced number of overidentifying restrictions.
We proceed by testing the orthogonality of our excluded instruments and the error term in the "second stage." As indicated by the Hansen J-Statistics reported in Table 2 , we cannot reject orthogonality in any case. Accordingly, our excluded instruments are valid and we can test whether the potential endogeneity bias outlined in Section 3 indeed materializes. Table 2 presents C-tests of exogeneity of the included dummy variables for perceived job insecurity. As indicated by the high Hansen J-Statistics, we can confidently reject exogeneity for all samples. Hence, the previously discussed endogeneity bias is indeed relevant. Not accounting for the simultaneity of perceived job insecurity and individual well-being results in biased coefficients.
We can quantify the size of the bias by comparing a restricted but efficient fixed effects model that assumes exogeneity of F with a consistent model that allows for endogeneity by instrumenting for F . In the light of the discussed poor finite sample properties of GMM models with a large number of orthogonality conditions we do so by utilizing the GMM model 12 The Kleibergen-Paap rank LM test is a heteroscedasticity-robust variant of the Anderson canonical correlation test. See Paap (2006) for further details. 13 We employ heteroscedasticity robust GMM estimations. All estimations and corresponding tests are carried out using the outstanding Stata ad-ons "ivreg2" and "xtivreg2" provided by Baum, Schaffer, Stillman (2003 . with a reduced number of orthogonality conditions reported in the second half of Table 2. 14 Table 3 presents respective coefficient estimates for the whole sample and for completeness by gender for the restricted efficient as well as the consistent model. Regarding our standard control variables, our coefficients are in line with earlier empirical studies although many coefficients are not identified with sufficient precision. This may not be surprising, however, as we control for fixed individual as well as time effects.
Regarding perceived job insecurity, which we are most interested in, we find a negative and statistically significant effect on individual well-being in all model specifications with some small differences between genders. However, most importantly, in line with our expectation sketched out in Section 3, we find the coefficients of perceived job insecurity to be significantly upward biased in the simple restricted model that ignores simultaneity between perceptions of 14 We also report results for GMM models with full polynomial specification of the "first stage" in Appendix B.
job insecurity and individual well-being. We can illustrate the size of the bias by calculating the compensating income differential as is commonly done in the literature (e.g., Winkelmann
and Winkelmann 1998, Kassenböhmer and Haisken DeNew 2009). Thus, we can ask by how much individuals' income had to be raised to compensate them for the negative well-being effects of perceived job insecurity.
Using the point estimates from the biased model reported in Column I of Table 3 , the compensating income differential of becoming somewhat concerned relative to being not concerned about job security is 1.4 log points (∆ ln(hhincome) = 0.1091/0.0781) while for the very concerned it is 3.3 log points (∆ ln(hhincome) = 0.2603/0.0781). When relying instead on the unbiased point estimates from Column II of Table 3 , we find the compensating income differential to be 3.9 (∆ ln(hhincome) = 0.2911/0.075) and 8.5 (∆ ln(hhincome) = 0.6367/0.075) log points for somewhat and very concerned respondents, respectively.
Similarly, when using the point estimates from the naively estimated model for the male sub-sample (see Column III in Table 3 ) we find the compensating income differential to be 1.6 log points for somewhat concerned and 3.6 log points for very concerned males. When accounting for simultaneity, the compensating income differential is 4.4 and 10 log points respectively (see Column IV in Table 3 ). When looking at the model for the female subsample, our naively estimated coefficients imply a compensating income differential of 1.2 log points for somewhat concerned and 3 log points for very concerned female respondents. The endogeneity consistent GMM model implies a compensating income differential of 2.9 log points for somewhat concerned and 6.6 log points for very concerned females (see Columns V and VI in Table 3 ).
Thus, while there is some variation in the magnitude of the negative well-being effects of perceived job insecurity across gender, with males being most adversely affected, we generally find the true unbiased effect of perceived job insecurity to be more than twice the size of the naively estimated effects. Accordingly and in line with our theoretical prediction in Section 3, ignoring simultaneity between perceived job insecurity and individual well-being as is commonly done in the literature (e.g., Ferrie et al. 2004 , De Witte 1999 , Sverke and Hellgren 2002 Clark et al. 2009, Knabe and Rätzel, 2009 ) drastically underestimates the negative impact of job insecurity perceptions.
It is informative to put the size of the effects of perceived job insecurity in perspective by comparing compensating income differentials of other individual characteristics. For instance, using the regression results for the pooled sample from Column II in Table 3 , the positive well-being effect of having a steady partner can only compensate for less than a quarter of the negative well-being effect of being very concerned about job security. Also, our estimates indicate that the negative well-being effect of being very concerned about job security, ceteris paribus, is more than eighteen times higher than the positive well-being effect women experience after their first child is born. Furthermore, being very concerned about job security has similar well-being effects to having fairly bad health as approximated by an equivalent number of 177 doctor visits per year. Accordingly, we can establish that perceived job insecurity is indeed one of the major determinants of employees' well-being.
In addition, perceived job insecurity also has implications for evaluating the well-being costs of unemployment and other labor force statuses. According to 
that is, one has to take perceived job insecurity of those in employment into account.
On this basis we can calculate the compensating income differential, that is, the hypothetical income increase that holds individuals well-being constant once they become unemployed. Using the point estimates from the pooled regression (Column II in Table 3 ), we calculate a compensating income differential of 7 log points ∆ ln(hhincome) = (0.5247)/0.075)
for recently unemployed individuals who were not concerned about their job security during employment. For the recent unemployed who were somewhat concerned about their job security when employed, the compensation income differential is 3.1 log points (∆ ln(hhincome) = (0.5247 − 0.2911)/0.075).
This clearly confirms earlier findings of, for example, Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) and points to a very large non-pecuniary component in the well-being effect of unemployment (see, e.g., Jahoda 1981 Jahoda , 1986 for explanations).
However, our estimates also indicate that for recently unemployed individuals who were very concerned about their job security when employed, this compensating income differential actually becomes negative (∆ ln(hhincome) = (0.5247 − 0.6367)/0.075 = −1.5 log points).
Hence, this group of respondents actually becomes better off when their feared job loss eventually materializes.
Thus, for respondents who are very concerned about their job security, the negative well-being effects of job loss concerns are even larger than the well-being loss associated with recent unemployment. Accordingly, we can confirm a hypothesis put forward in the psychological literature (e.g., Cobb and Kasl 1977) and postulate that the fear of job loss may indeed be more damaging for individual well-being than actual job loss and unemployment. 
Conclusion
The present paper assesses the importance of job insecurity perceptions as a determinant of individual well-being. In Contrast to previous studies, our concept of perceived job insecurity explicitly takes into account individual perceptions about the likelihood of job loss as well as perceptions about the associated costs of job loss. We demonstrate that both job loss risk and cost perceptions constitute essential components of individual perceived job insecurity.
Consequently, we theoretically demonstrate that through the associated cost component of job loss, any model assessing the impact of perceived job insecurity on individual well-being potentially suffers from simultaneity bias resulting in upward-biased coefficients. To the present date, the economics literature as well as other fields of the social sciences have ignored this problem and have thereby systematically underestimated the impact of job insecurity perceptions.
To illustrate the size of the simultaneity bias, we apply our concept of perceived job insecurity to a model of individual well-being using a large household panel survey and circumventing endogeneity by instrumenting. In our application, we find the true unbiased effects of perceived job insecurity to be more than twice the size of estimates that ignore simultaneity. Thus, simultaneity bias is not only a theoretical concern but is also very relevant empirically.
In comparison to other determinants, our results suggest that perceived job insecurity ranks as one of the most important factors for employees' well-being. Furthermore, our estimates indicate that while recent experience of unemployment is associated with substantial well-being losses, this is only true in comparison to employed individuals who are not or only somewhat concerned about their job security. For individuals who are very concerned about their job security, we have the paradoxical situation that when the event of job loss they fear eventually materializes, their well-being actually increases. Thus, for some individuals, the fear of job loss is more harmful to their well-being than actual job loss with subsequent unemployment.
Why does this matter? First of all, from a subjectivist viewpoint, our findings about the well-being effects of perceived job insecurity are interesting and relevant in their own right, as they concern welfare (see, e.g. 
A Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our individual-level data is from the 2008 release of the German Socio-Economic panel (GSOEP). We utilize all samples and make no exclusions with respect to foreigner status or former East and West Germany. As our analysis draws on information about subjective job loss risk which is only available on an biannual basis starting in 1999 we can only utilize data for the years 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007. Our sample consists of male and female respondents in prime age (18-64 years). We do not select observations based on labor market status but rather include dummy variables and interaction terms for respondents in employment, self-employment, unemployment or out-of labor force. However, we do exclude a specific type of public officials from the analysis, namely "Beamte" that generally cannot be laid off.
We further only select individuals for which we have more than one wave of observation. In addition we had to exclude respondents with missing life satisfaction information, our dependent variable and missing information on perceived job insecurity, our main variable of interest. Other than that we make no exclusion with respect to item non-response and supplement the analysis with dummy variables for item non-response and recode missing values to zero. Furthermore, due to our fixed effects specification we only include respondents with a least two completed interviews over the sample period. This yields an unbalanced sample of 68622 observations for 18974 individuals. 
B Robustness Check
According to Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) applying OLS or extended conditional logit methods that maintain non-linearity yields similar estimates as long as unobserved individual heterogeneity is appropriately accounted for. Accordingly, we re-estimate all specifications relying on simple linear fixed effects models to benchmark our findings from probit-adapted OLS which had not been discussed in Ferreri-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) . Table 5 presents the respective coefficients. Again, our earlier finding of a substantial simultaneity bias is confirmed. When looking at the pooled model of males and females the unbiased estimates of perceived job insecurity correspond to a compensating income differential of 2.5 log points for somewhat concerned individuals and 8 log points for very concerned individuals. Thus, they are fairly similar to the estimates from our earlier probit-adapted linear fixed effects model.
When calculating the compensating income differential of becoming unemployed we find it to be 6.38 log points for recent unemployed that were not concerned about their job security when in employment, 3.9 log points for the somewhat concerned and -1.6 log points for the very concerned. Accordingly, our estimates from simple fixed effects OLS are again close to the ones from the probit-adapted OLS model. Summarizing, after controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity our results derived through probit-adapted OLS as suggested by Van Praag and Ferrer-iCarbonell (2008) are robust to applying simple OLS which also suggests that using extended conditional logit methods, which, however, do not easily lend themselves to GMM methods, yields fairly similar results (see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004) .
As a further robustness check we re-estimate our GMM models using the polynomial "first stage" specification with 46 excluded instruments. Again, we find naively estimated effects of job loss concerns to be downward biased in comparison to the GMM results that account for simultaneity. We calculate a compensating income differential of 3.3 log points for respondents who report to be somewhat concerned about their job security and 7.6 log points for very concerned individuals (see Table 6 ). Thus, based on these estimates we can conclude that the size of the simultane- 
